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ABSTRACT: The primary goal of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary 
policy is to achieve price stability. Whereas during the 1980s and 1990s there was a 
rapid and strong convergence in terms of price differential among the Euro countries, 
particularly in those countries with higher inflation rates in the past, single monetary 
policy has proved to be quite inefficient in continuing this trend and has not achieved 
further reductions in inflation rate differentials within the euro zone. Since the ECB sets 
the official interest rate according to the average inflation of the euro  area, the 
persistence of such price differentials within the area would mean that the “one size 
interest rate policy” would not fit all. This paper studies empirically the inflation rate 
differentials and their persistence in some currency unions with the  aim to draw some 
conclusions for the working of the ECB monetary policy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is well known that the primary goal of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary 
policy is to a chieve price stability. Empirical evidence shows that during the 1980’s and 
1990’s there was a rapid and strong convergence in terms of price differential among 
the euro countries, particularly in those countries with higher inflation rates in the past. 
Nevertheless, convergence in inflation rates has stopped and ended since the mid 90’s and 
this fact has raised fears that the single monetary policy is not adequate for a number of 
countries (Björksten and Syrjänen, 2000). This latter possibility was not a major concern 
during the first years of the single monetary policy since the average rate of inflation was 
low and its dispersion among the European Monetary Union (EMU) countries was 
expected to be soon removed by the introduction of the single currency.
1 However, even 
the ECB now acknowledges that inflation differentials across regions are a natural feature 
of the monetary union, and that monetary policy cannot influence them (ECB, 2004: 53). 
Actually, the persistence in inflation differentials within the  EMU area was one of the 
arguments considered by the ECB to explain why it has officially refused to bring inflation 
below its 2 per cent objective and finally adopted the new target of an “inflation rate 
below, but close to, 2% over the medium term” in year 2003 (ECB, 2003a).
2 
The perpetuation of the inflation differentials within the euro area raises some 
interesting issues. Firstly, the persistence of inflation differential within the euro area 
                                                                 
1 The single currency was expected to remove market segmentation, enhance market competition and 
therefore would make the law of one price work in the medium term. 
2 The purpose of this change is “to maintain a sufficient safety margin to guard against the risks of 
deflation” (ECB 2003a: 79). However, if inflation is a monetary phenomenon, as the ECB seems to 
believe when justifying the first pillar of its monetary policy scheme, there should not be room for 
deflation because the Central Bank could always produce inflation by increasing the money supply. If the 
Central Bank has the tools to avoid excess money, it should also be able to avoid the reverse situation. If 
this is not the case, then what’s the point in keeping an eye on the rate of growth of the M3 in the long run 
(the first pillar)?   3
might mean that inflation is not always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, so the 
single monetary policy would not be efficient in fighting inflation within the euro area.
3 
Secondly, since the ECB sets the official interest rate according to the average inflation 
rate of the euro area, the persistence of such price differentials within the euro area 
would mean that “one size does not fit all”, and this might have important economic 
consequences, particularly for the euro countries with structurally lower inflation rates 
(ECB, 2004: 54). For this reason the ECB has pointed out that “it is necessary for 
monetary policy to consider the size, persistence and determinants of inflation 
differentials in assessing the area-wide inflation dynamics” (ECB, 2003b: 6). This paper 
addresses the implications that persistence in i nflation differentials might have for the 
European single monetary policy. In particular, the paper studies empirically the 
inflation rate differentials and their persistence in some currency unions with the aim to 
draw some conclusions for the working of  the ECB monetary policy. Section two 
briefly outlines the ECB’s monetary framework. The aim of this section is to describe 
the role that inflation plays in the ECB’s monetary strategy, particularly in the context 
of the monetary policy rules current debate (Taylor, 1993). Section three identifies the 
theoretical factors that might explain regional inflation differentials and inflation 
persistence within a currency union. Section four analyses regional inflation 
differentials in two long established currency unions (Spain and the United States) and 
confronts these results with the EMU experience. Finally, section five offers some 
                                                                 
3 Of course, the ECB could always reply that inflation is a monetary phenomenon only in the long run, so 
it is still too soon to say anything about monetary policy effectiveness in Europe (actually, the single 
monetary policy has been working only since 1999). However, there is empirical evidence showing that 
the correlation between money and inflation is weak for the low inflation countries, and that “country 
specific factors have a significant influence on the strength of such relationship” (De Grauwe and Polan, 
2001). King (2002) provides evidence on the strong correlation between monetary growth and inflation in 
the long-run, although in the short run this correlation is less evident, but he also points out that 
“correlation, of course, is not causation”.   4
conclusions and explores some implications for the conduction of the single European 
monetary policy. 
 
2. THE ECB’S MONETARY STRATEGY AND THE ROLE OF INFLATION 
The ECB’s monetary strategy was formally defined by its Governing Council in October, 
1998, and consists of a “framework and the procedures that the central bank uses to 
translate relevant information into monetary policy decisions” (Issing et al., 2001: 2). 
Contrary to simple monetary policy rules, such as the so-called Taylor’s rule (Taylor, 
1993), “the ECB’s monetary strategy is presented as an information-processing 
framework”, and as such, “it cannot be expressed in a simple mathematical function” 
(Issing et al., 2001: 4-5). 
It has been pointed out that the ECB cannot follow a fixed (or known) rule because 
of the uncertainties that surround the European Monetary Union (EMU) experiment. By 
the time the ECB’s monetary policy “ architecture” was designed, in 1998, there was 
uncertainty about the institutional change that the introduction of the single currency 
would mean.
4 But even after the launching of the euro and the introduction of the single 
monetary policy uncertainty still remains. There is uncertainty about the response given by 
economic agents (parameter uncertainty) and the nature of the “true” economic model 
(model uncertainty) of the euro area (Issing et al., 2001: 100). These two elements are 
crucial for the implementation of the monetary policy. 
Even though “model uncertainty” is claimed, the ECB does have an implicit 
economic model in its monetary framework. This model takes into account the 
existence of a high correlation between money and inflation and assumes that money 
                                                                 
4 That institutional change had straightforward and substantial implications for the continuity and availability 
of reliable statistical information which would be crucial for the decision-making process at the ECB, for 
example.   5
causes inflation in the long run. However, the ECB also acknowledges that the 
correlation between money and prices vanishes in the short run. Monetary policy has 
real effects because of the existence of imperfect information, competition or economic 
rigidities, either real or financial (see Issing et al., 2001, particularly chapter 1). These 
assumptions are present in the “two pillars” of the ECB’s monetary policy.
5 According to 
the principle that money causes inflation in the long run, the first pillar monitors monetary 
aggregates and the ECB has a specific reference value for the rate of growth of the M3 in 
the long run.
6 On the contrary, the second pillar focuses on short-term price developments. 
The ECB monitors a wide range of economic and financial indicators to carry out this task. 
The prominent role assigned to monetary aggregates in the first pillar has led some 
authors to question the ECB’s monetary strategy (see Begg et al., 1999; Svensson, 1999; 
Gross et al., 2000). These critics point out that the existence of two pillars does not provide 
a clear explanation of the ECB’s strategy and that financial innovation reduces the 
reliability of the first pillar. However, there are some authors who defend the strategy by 
pointing out that “the two p illars symbolise the still insufficient knowledge concerning the 
functions of the macro-economy and the characteristics of the transmission process” 
(Issing et al., 2001: 108) and that the use of a simple rule would not allow the central bank 
to take into account “all potential sources of information” which is relevant for monetary 
policy decisions (Issing et al., 2001). 
                                                                 
5 For a fuller description see Issing et al. (2001), chapter 7. 
6 The reference value was set in terms of an annual rate of growth of 4.5 per cent for the whole euro area. 
Interestingly, this value was worked out by using the quantity theory of money, assuming a 2 per cent rate 
of growth for prices, a 2-2.5 per cent rate of growth for GDP and a declining trend in the income-money 
velocity of circulation (ECB, 1999).   6
Although most central banks deny following a deterministic monetary policy 
rule, there exists a large (and growing) empirical literature
7  showing that simple 
monetary rules, such as the one proposed by Taylor (1993), are capable of reproducing 
central banks’ monetary policy decisions on interest rates. Regarding the euro area, 
Taylor (1999) recently concluded that “the simple benchmark rule, such as the one I 
proposed in 1992, with some adjustment in the response coefficients, would be worth 
considering as a guideline for the ECB”.  Gerlach and Schnabel (1999) also found that 
“average interest rates for the EMU countries in 1990-98, with the e xception of the 
exchange market turmoil in 1992-93, moved very closely with the average output gap 
and inflation as suggested by the Taylor rule. More evidence in this regard can be also 
found in the papers by Alesina  et al.  (2001), von Hagen and Brückner (2002), Breuss 
(2002) and Galí (2003), among many others. 
These empirical results are not surprising since the Taylor rule assumes that 
central banks set the official interest rate according to the deviation of both inflation and 
output from their targets. Analytically, the rule can be expressed as: 
( ) t x t t x r i f p p f p p + - + + = ˆ ˆ ˆ                (1) 
where it is a money market interest rate under the control of the monetary authority,  r ˆ is 
the equilibrium or natural real interest rate,  p ˆ  is the inflation target,  t p  is the current 
rate of inflation and 
n
t t t y y x - ”  is the output gap, being  yt and  y
n the current and 
potential output, respectively. The parameters  fp and  fx indicate the response of 
monetary authority against deviations of the inflation rate from its target and variations 
in the output gap. 
                                                                 
7 See, for example, Gerlach and Schnabel (2000), Taylor (1999), Clarida et al. (1998 and 2000), Nelson 
(2000), Batini and Haldane (1999) and Angeloni and Dedola (1999).   7
In this regard, it is worth remembering that “the primary objective of the ESCB 
is to maintain price stability”.
8 But the EU treaty also points out that “without prejudice 
of the objective of price stability the ESCB shall support the general economic policies 
in the Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of 
the Community as laid down in Article 2.
9 It is not surprising, therefore, that the ECB 
takes into account not only the inflation rate, but also a variable reflecting the economic 
pulse of the area, such as the output gap, when setting the official interest rates for the 
euro area. Figure 1 confirms this fact by showing a high correlation between the market 
interest rate and the inflation rate for the euro area, and also between the interest rate 
and the output gap.
10 The second correlation is much higher (0.77) than the first one 
(0.44). 
                                                                 
8 Article 105 of the EU Treaty. 
9 Article 2 states that: “The Community shall have as its task … to promote throughout the Community a 
harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth 
respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of economic performance, a high level of 
employment and social protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic 
social cohesion and solidarity among Member States”. 
10 We employed the industrial production index as an output variable and the Hodrick-Prescott filter as 
the method to extract the potential output. Output gap is measured as the twelve months average, 
intending to provide a smooth indicator of this variable.    8
































































































































































































Source: European Central Bank 
 
The same information is shown in Figure 2, where the money market interest 
rate and the benchmark interest rate performed by the Taylor rule is depicted.
11 
According to Figure 2, the Taylor rule matches reasonably well with the money market 
interest rate, particularly up to 2001. It is evident, therefore, that both inflation and 
output gap play an important role in the determination of the interest rates in the euro 
area. However, whereas the interest rate is equal for all countries, inflation rates may 
vary from one country to another. Temporal or small variations would not be a concern. 
However, if the regional variations in inflation rates were both sizeable and permanent, 
then the ECB would not be really implementing a one size interest rate policy for the 
euro area. How important are the inflation differentials within the Euro area? Are they 
also persistent? To what extent is the EMU different to other established currency 
areas? These issues will be addressed in the remaining part of the paper. 
                                                                 
11 In relation to expression (1), Taylor (1993) assumed the following values for the different parameters in 
the rule:  2 ˆ ˆ = =p r , f p=1.5 and f x=0.5.   9
 






































































































































































Source: European Central Bank and own results 
 
 
3. FACTORS UNDERLYING REGIONAL INFLATION DIFFERENTIALS AND 
THEIR PERSISTENCE 
The identification of the factors explaining the evolution of regional inflation 
differentials in Europe has been a topic of major concern in the last years. In fact, the 
existence of inflation differentials within the EMU area was considered to be a crucial 
element in the recent evaluation of the performance of the single monetary policy (see 
ECB, 2003a). 
Factors explaining regional inflation differentials in a currency union may be 
better understood if they were grouped according to their temporal dimension. 
According to this categorization, we will distinguish, on the one hand, those factors 
influencing inflation differentials in the short run and, on the other hand, those acting in   10 
the medium to long term. Three arguments are usually provided in order to explain 
inflation differentials within a currency union in the short run. The first one concerns 
the different impact that the single monetary policy may have on inflation when 
regional differences in terms of t he monetary transmission mechanism exist.
12 The 
second one assumes that regional divergences in terms of output gaps might cause 
higher inflationary pressures in those economies with advanced business cycles.
13 The 
third argument sustains that inflation differentials within a currency union arise because 
of the regional differences in terms of openness. For example, differences in national oil 
dependency might spur inflation differential when oil prices go up. Another example is 
that the inflation rate in the most open economies will be more dependant of the 
evolution of nominal exchanges rates, thus the depreciation of nominal exchange rates 
could increase inflation differentials among the members of a currency union. 
There are also factors which explain regional inflation differentials in the 
medium to long run. One factor is the price level differences which might exist between 
the regions of a currency union. If price levels differ across countries in the currency 
union, the expected convergence of prices t o a common level could give rise to 
differences in inflation rates in the transition period since the countries with lower price 
levels would experience higher inflation rates than those with higher price level at the 
initial stage. A key factor that can spur price level convergence is price transparency. At 
the same time, price transparency can be enhanced by the completion of the internal 
market, by the introduction of a single currency or by the shortening of the geographical 
distance. The convergence in price levels in the euro countries has been studied, among 
                                                                 
12 These factors can have a real or a financial nature. For a recent survey of this issue in the European 
Monetary Union, see Angeloni et al. (2002). 
13 An explanation of the inflationary Spanish experience based on these factors can be found in Ledo et al. 
(2002).   11 
others, by Hendrikx and Chapple (2002), Honohan and Lane (2003), Rogers (2002), 
Rogers et al. (2002), ECB (2003b) and Kent (2003). Their empirical results tend to 
confirm the relevance of price level convergence on the path of inflation differentials 
among European countries in the last years. However, as argued in Rogers et al. (2002), 
other forces explain most of the current cross-country differences in the euro area 
inflation. 
Another potential  explanation for the inflation differentials within a currency 
union can be found in the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis
14, whereby countries with 
lower productivity in the traded sector experience more rapid productivity growth on the 
path of convergence. The  adjustment process leads to a higher rate of wage inflation in 
the economy as a whole, and hence a positive inflation differential.
15 The relevance of 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect has also been confirmed by Alberola and Tyrväinen 
(1998), Canzoneri et al. (1999), De Grauwe and Skuldeny (2000) and Olivera (2003), 
although the empirical evidence provided in these papers does not rule out the 
possibility for other factors to affect inflation differentials within the euro area. 
Whereas the determinants of inflation differentials in currency unions have been a 
common topic for research in the last years, inflation persistence has received far less 
attention. This might be explained by the fact that persistence in inflation rates was 
expected to be removed in the medium term, either by the implementation of the single 
monetary policy or by cross border arbitrage among different markets. A single 
monetary policy avoids the existence of national monetary policies persistently 
targeting at different inflation objectives. At the same time, a single currency enhances 
                                                                 
14 See Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). 
15 Wage inflation is proportional to productivity growth in the traded sector. However, in the non-traded 
sector prices have to rise because productivity is assumed to growth slower than wage inflation.    12 
price transparency, reducing the scope for persistent differences in the pricing policy 
followed by firms. 
 However, several reasons have been put forward to explain why inflation 
differentials persistence may be more important within a currency union than among 
independent countries. First, the setting of a single nominal interest rate for the whole 
euro area would mean a different real interest rates for those member countries with 
higher inflation rates. If  the inflation rates go up during expansions because of the 
higher demand pressure, the resulting lower real interest rate might amplify the business 
cycle and, therefore, inflation. Second, and partly derived from the former, a booming 
region with a higher inflation rate and a lower real interest rate may experience higher 
increases in both nominal and real housing prices which, in turn, may stimulate 
consumption through the balance sheet effects.
16 
A controversial question with regard to the persistence of  inflation differentials 
within a currency union is the role that the real exchange rate might play in the 
adjustment process. It is commonly assumed that a booming regional economy is 
expected to experience a real appreciation in its exchange rate because of the changes in 
relative prices between the domestic market and the rest of the union. If firms cannot 
segment markets, the reduction in the external demand (derived from the real 
appreciation) will mitigate the economic boom, and therefore contributes t o the 
adjustment process (Arnold and Kool, 2002). However, recent contributions in the field 
of international economics point out that international price discrimination (pricing-to-
market policies) reduce the scope for the expenditure-switching effect to  work (see 
Obstfeld (2002) for a recent survey on this topic). Bergin (2003) proposes a pricing-to-
                                                                 
16 The recent developments of the housing markets both in Spain and Ireland could support this 
explanation.   13 
market model for a monetary union
17 and concludes that inflation differentials can 
appear in a monetary union and persist a long time, even in tradable products, due to the 
market power of firms that engage in price discrimination among different markets. 
Although we have focussed on differences in the degree of persistence of 
inflation differentials within the regions of a monetary union and across independent 
countries, there are also several reasons why the persistence on inflation differentials 
can vary across currency unions. A first argument points to the existence of different 
degrees of economic policy centralisation. For example, a higher degree of budgetary 
centralisation can ameliorate demand pressures in different regions of the monetary 
union. Another argument highlights the role of nominal rigidities in the goods and 
labour markets. Let us assume two currency unions. In one currency union there exist a 
better coordination between firms and workers, thus nominal price and wage rigidities 
are similar across its regions. In the other currency union the coordination is lower. In 
these settings, it is expected to observe less persistent inflation differentials as 
coordination between firms and workers increases. 
So far we have surveyed some of the arguments put forward to explain the 
existence of inflation differentials within a currency union, along with those suggested 
to explain their degree of persistence. The next section explores these questions from an 
empirical point of view in order to answer a set of questions. We employ a dataset of 
EMU countries, before and after forming the currency union, and of different regions of 
two long-established currency unions: the United States and Spain. 
                                                                 
17 An aspect that deserves being highlighted is the relevance of the analytical way employed to introduce 
the pricing-to-market behaviour in the model. As Bergin (2003) states, the models that generate pricing to 
market by assuming that goods prices are sticky in the currency of the importer are unable to explain 
pricing to market in the context of a monetary union. However, models that use translog preferences (as 
the one proposed by Bergin, 2003) rely neither on multiple currencies nor sticky prices. For this reason, 
they can generate pricing to market in currency unions. These models have the advantage of keeping 
nearer to the initial development of pricing to market in the microeconomic literature.   14 
 
4. REGIONAL INFLATION DIFFERENTIALS IN CURRENCY UNIONS. 
SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE EMU COUNTRIES AND THE 
REGIONS IN SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 
This section studies the regional inflation differentials and their persistence between the 
euro countries, the Spanish regions and some regions of the United States. Since some 
analysts have suggested that it is still too soon as to evaluate whether the ECB has 
succeeded in achieving the price stability goal (the EMU started in year 1999), the 
comparison with the results achieved in some other longer-established currency unions, 
such as Spain or the United States, might offer some clues in this regard. 
  Inflation data for the 15 countries belonging to the European Union w as 
retrieved from  Main Economic Indicators (OECD, 2003). Spanish regional data for the 
17 Autonomous Communities was extracted from the  Spanish National Statistics 
Institute (INE), while data for 14 USA´s Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) was 
retrieved from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). All data are monthly, except for 11 
MSA where bimonthly data are available, and extends from January 1980 to December 
2002. 
The trend of inflation rates among the EMU countries shows a convergence 
pattern since the beginning of the 80’s. The high inflation economies have achieved 
outstanding results in terms of the reduction in inflation rates, particularly from the mid 
90’s. This success is to a large extent explained by the political determination of some 
countries to meet the Maastricht criteria. Figure 3 shows the maximum and minimum 
inflation rate among the EMU countries, and also the standard deviation for the whole 
area. The observed reduction both in the maximum rate and in the standard deviation 
reveals the underlying convergence process in terms of inflation rates in the euro area.    15 
 























































































































































































































Source: Main Economic Indicators, OECD 
 
As a consequence of that, inflation differentials could be expected to definitively 
disappear with the establishment of the single currency. However, a closer look at the 
inflation trends in some countries does not seem to support this assumption. In 
particular, there is a group of countries, like Portugal or Spain, where the inflation rate 
has persistently remained well above the euro area rate (see Figure 4). Conversely, there 
is a group of countries (like France or Germany) which has persistently experienced 
lower inflation rates. Interestingly, inflation rates were quite close a mong the selected 
countries in 1997 and 1998, coinciding with the evaluation of the Maastricht criteria, 
but they started to diverge when the third stage of EMU was set up.    16 
FIGURE 4.- Differentials in inflation rates in some European countries 



















































































































































































































Source: Main Economic Indicators, OECD 
 
The above-mentioned trends in inflation rates have raised some concerns for the 
European policy makers. Some authors have pointed out that the differences observed 
for the Euro area can also be found in other long-established monetary unions, such as 
the United States, Germany or Spain. To check out this possibility, we include Figures 5 
and 6, which present the standard deviation and the absolute spread in inflation rates for 
the euro area countries, the Spanish regions and some regions in the United States. The 
time period considered extends from 1994 to 2002, thus we focus on a recent period 
where nominal stability has been a political priority. 
There are three features worth mentioning in both cases.  A first trend confirms 
the existence of convergence in inflation rates among the euro economies, which stops 
at the beginning of 2000 and rises slightly afterwards. This result is consistent with the   17 
important role played by the fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria and the monetary 
unification in the reduction of inflation differentials. However, they do not totally 
disappear with the implementation of a single monetary policy.  As it can be seen in 
Figures 5 and 6, there is significant inflation dispersion in all the currency unions 
considered in this paper. Additionally, some important differences can be highlighted 
across the unions studied. In particular, the inflation dispersion for the euro area and the 
United States is around twice as much the value  for the Spanish regions. The higher 
dispersion for the inflation rates in the EMU area and the United States could be 
explained by the lower degree of economic policy centralisation achieved in terms of 
fiscal, labour and product market policies and also b y the higher geographical distance 
in comparison to the Spanish regional case (see ECB, 2003b). The close similitude 
between the euro area and the United States after the introduction of the euro put into 
question the relevance of some exclusive explanation to the observed inflation 
differentials within the euro area, among them, the differences in terms of price and 
productivity levels. The most interesting conclusion, which can be derived from Figures 
5 and 6, is that inflation differentials are not a specific problem of euro area members, 
since the size of inflation differentials observed at present in the euro area is not too 
different from the ones observed in the United States.  
   18 
FIGURE 5.- Standard deviation of inflation rates in EMU countries, the 





















































































































































































Source: Main Economic Indicators, INE and BLS 
 
FIGURE 6.- Absolute spread in inflation rates in EMU countries, the 





















































































































































































Source: Main Economic Indicators, INE and BLS 
 
Although inflation differentials do not seem to be a specific problem of the euro 
area, their degree of persistent might be. It would be a problem for the conduct of the 
single monetary policy, thus its analytical study is crucial for understanding the 
challenges that the E uropean Central Bank has to face. We will distinguish two different 
aspects related to inflation persistence. First, the degree of persistence of inflation   19 
differentials will be compared among the regions belonging to a monetary union and the 
euro area countries before the beginning of stage three of EMU. Second, we will test for 
the existence of different degrees of persistence across currency unions. Data for the 
euro area countries, the Spanish regions and some regions of the United States during 
the period 1999-2003 will be used.
18 
In order to address the first issue, we have employed a set of unit root and 
stationary tests. To understand the mechanics of these tests, consider the following 
simple autoregressive process of order one AR(1) for the inflation rates differentials: 
( ) ( ) t t
area i
t
area i e p p r a p p + - + = - -1           (2) 
where ( p
i  -  p
area) is the inflation differential for the country  i with respect to the 
reference area considered, a and r are the parameters to be estimated and et is assumed 
to be white noise. If  |r|  ‡ 1, the inflation differential is a non-stationary process and 
therefore no convergence is expected to take place. On the contrary, if  |r| < 1, the 
inflation differential is a stationary series and convergence is expected to take place. 
Additionally, the value of r determines the speed of the convergence process. 
The unit root tests test the null hypothesis H 0:  r = 1, against the one-sided 
alternative H 1:  r < 1. Our paper employs different unit root tests proposed in the 
literature, such as the Augmented D ickey-Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979), the 
Phillips-Perron test (Phillips and Perron, 1988), the Dickey-Fuller test with GLS 
detrending (Elliot  et al., 1996) and the Elliot, Rothemberg and Stock optimal point test 
(Elliot et al., 1996). 
Alternatively, stationary tests test the null hypothesis H 0:  r < 1. In our paper, we 
apply the KPSS test proposed by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). The combination of 
                                                                 
18 In this case, we employ the Harmonised Consumer Price Index  (HCPI) data from Eurostat for the euro 
area countries, which is available from 1995.   20 
different kinds of tests allows us to obtain a more robust conclusion about the 
convergence (or no convergence) of inflation differentials in the long run. 
We compare the stationary properties of inflation differentials among some 
European countries, the Spanish regions and some regions of the United States before 
the start of EMU. Data availability limits the time period considered from January 1980 
to December 1998. By means of this comparison we aim to find some clues to answer 
the question of whether inflation differentials are more persistent among countries with 
independent monetary policies than among regions within a currency union.  
Tables 1 and 2 sum up the results of applying the stationary and unit root tests to 
the inflation differential series for the euro area countries and the regions in Spain and 
some regions of the United Sates. With regard to  persistence in inflation, the results 
confirm the existence of a higher persistence in inflation differentials among the current 
euro area countries. Table 1 suggests that the non-stationary behaviour of inflation 
differentials cannot be rejected in most c ases (in eight countries out of the eleven 
considered). In the remainder cases, the evidence is mixed; that is, we cannot clearly 
determine the nature of the data. 
 
TABLE 1.- Unit root and stationary test of inflation differentials in Euro area countries 
(1980:01-1998:12) 
  Unit root tests  Stationary test 
  ADF  PP  DF-GLS  ERS  KPSS 
Conclusion 
Austria  NO  NO  NO  NO  **  Non-stationary 
Belgium  *  *  NO  NO  **  Mixed-evidence 
Finland  *  **  NO  NO  NO  Mixed-evidence 
France  NO  NO  NO  NO  **  Non-stationary 
Germany  NO  NO  NO  NO  **  Non-stationary 
Greece  NO  NO  NO  NO  **  Non-stationary 
Italy  NO  NO  NO  NO  **  Non-stationary 
Luxembourg  *  *  NO  NO  *  Mixed-evidence 
Netherlands  NO  NO  NO  NO  **  Non-stationary 
Portugal  NO  NO  NO  NO  **  Non-stationary 
Spain  NO  NO  NO  NO  **  Non-stationary 
Notes: One and two asterisks represent statistical significance at a 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively. 
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Additionally, the degree of persistence of the different series was calculated 
from the ADF test obtained, using for this purpose the half-life o f the adjustment 
process for each country. The half-life statistic depends on the value of  r and its 








5 , 0 ln
HL . The expression gives us a measure of 
the time that a series needs to return to its equilibrium once it is affected by a shock. As 
we have a different estimated  r value for each of the series, we will take its pooled 
value as representative for the whole group so we can obtained r values for each of the 
two groups considered: the European countries and the regions in Spain and in the 
United States. The differences between the estimated values are very important. Hence, 
whereas for the European countries the half-life is approximately 22 months, for the 
Spanish and the United States regions it is only 4.5 months. 
 
TABLE 2.- Unit root and stationary test of inflation differentials in the Spanish and 
 the United States regions (1980:01-1998:12) 
  Unit root tests  Stationary test 
  ADF  PP  DF-GLS  ERS  KPSS 
Conclusion 
Spanish regions 
Andalucia  **  **  NO  **  *  Mixed-evidence 
Aragon  **  **  NO  *  NO  Stationary 
Asturias  *  **  **  NO  NO  Stationary 
Baleares  *  **  NO  **  NO  Stationary 
Canarias  *  *  **  **  NO  Stationary 
Cantabria  **  **  NO  **  NO  Stationary 
Castilla y León  *  **  *  **  NO  Stationary 
Castilla La Mancha  NO  **  NO  NO  NO  Mixed-evidence 
Cataluña  NO  **  *  *  NO  Stationary 
Com. Valenciana  **  **  NO  NO  NO  Mixed-evidence 
Extremadura  **  **  *  **  NO  Stationary 
Galicia  *  **  NO  **  NO  Stationary 
Madrid  **  **  **  NO  NO  Stationary 
Murcia  NO  **  NO  **  NO  Mixed-evidence 
Navarra  **  **  **  **  **  Mixed-evidence 
País Vasco  NO  *  NO  NO  NO  Mixed-evidence 
La Rioja  **  **  NO  NO  NO  Mixed-evidence 
United States regions 
New York  *  **  NO  NO  NO  Mixed-evidence 
Chicago  **  **  NO  *  NO  Stationary 
Los Angeles  NO  **  NO  NO  *  Non-stationary 
Notes: One and two asterisks represent statistical significance at a 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively. 
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The higher estimated speed of convergence for the Spanish and, to a lesser 
extent the United States, could be explained by appealing to the arguments expressed in 
section 3 above, mainly the existence of a single monetary policy among the Spanish 
and the United States regions and the higher transparency in price comparisons. 
However, the remainder factors underlying a higher persistence of inflation d ifferentials 
within currency unions seem to have played a minor role. 
Although the results above mentioned are interesting, the study of persistent 
inflation differentials across currency unions may provide a more useful insight in this 
issue. In this vein, Table 3 summarises some measures of persistence of inflation 
differentials within the euro area countries, the Spanish regions and some regions of the 
United States for the period 1999-2003. Although monthly data are available, the short 
sampling of the  data does not recommend applying unit root tests in order to determine 
the stationary properties of inflation differentials. For that reason, alternative statistics 
were used to assess the degree of persistence. On the one hand, we calculate the 
autoregressive coefficient of different orders (first, second and forth) for the inflation 
differentials among the regions and the currency area as a whole. On the other hand, and 
following Batini (2002), Kozicki and Tinsley (2002) and Kieler (2003), the persistence 
of inflation differentials was measured as the sum of coefficients from an estimated 
autoregressive model of inflation differential, considering two alternative autoregressive 
orders (sixth and twelfth).  
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TABLE 3.- Persistence in inflation differentials among the EMU countries, the Spanish 
regions and some regions in the United Sates: 1999-2003 
  AR(1)  AR(2)  AR(4) 
Average  0.812  0.725  0.543 
Maximum  0.941  0.919  0.946  EMU 
Minimum  0.712  0.561  0.309 
Average  0.756  0.552  0.416 
Maximum  0.911  0.807  0.647  United States 
Minimum  0.549  0.149  0.050 
Average  0.763  0.607  0.380 
Maximum  0.937  0.890  0.781  Spain 
Minimum  0.570  0.250  -0.333 
Sum of coefficients from AR of order   
Sixth  Twelfth 
Average  0.856  0.717 
Maximum  0.974  0.951  EMU 
Minimum  0.738  0.497 
Average  0.752  0.297 
Maximum  0.974  0.926  United States 
Minimum  0.405  -0.754 
Average  0.734  0.523 
Maximum  0.935  0.956  Spain 
Minimum  0.359  -0.106 
Source: Eurostat, INE and BLS 
 
For all the measures calculated, the European inflation rates seem to diverge 
more persistently than in Spain and in the United States.
19 This result contrast with 
those previously obtained in this paper for inflation dispersion in currency unions 
because, in this case, persistence of inflation differentials seems to be an intrinsic 
feature of euro area economies. 
In order to offer an explanation for this behaviour, we must be aware that the 
factors underlying persistent inflation differentials have to be, to a certain degree, 
independent of the factor underlying inflation dispersion within regions of a currency 
union. This conclusion is derived from comparing the results obtained for the European 
Monetary Union and the United States. As argued before, regional inflation dispersion 
                                                                 
19 We used three MSA for the United States; that is, the three MSA for which monthly data were 
available.   24 
in these areas tends to be similar across time.  However, inflation differentials 
persistence is higher within the European Monetary Union. 
In section 3, we proposed two possible explanations for the diverging degrees of 
persistence in regional inflation differentials. A first factor was differences in t he degree 
of economic policy centralisation, but this reason was also used to explain the 
dispersion in regional inflation rates within currency unions. A second reason was 
differences in nominal rigidities in the goods and labour markets. Interestingly, t his 
factor can generate a different degree of inflation persistence without implying a higher 
dispersion in regional inflation rates. 
For understanding how differences in nominal rigidities can produce more 
persistent inflation differentials within a currency union, suppose a symmetric shock 
affecting the whole currency union, which induces changes in prices or wages. 
Although the impact of the shock depends basically on real factors, its persistence is 
closely related to nominal rigidities. Nominal rigidities do not affect the total impact of 
the shock, consequently, it is not expected to affect the inflation dispersion within the 
union. Notwithstanding, nominal rigidities play a role in the dynamic response of the 
economy to the initial shock. The inflation rate in those regions characterised by a 
higher degree of nominal rigidities will respond more sluggish to the initial shock. In 
fact, the higher the differences in the degree of nominal rigidities observed among the 
regions of a currency union, the more persistent the regional inflation differentials will 
be. To the extent that it is reasonable to expect that nominal rigidities are more similar 
among the Spanish and the United States regions than among the Euro countries, we 
have an argument to explain w hy inflation differentials persistence is higher in the 
European Monetary Union when compared to Spain and the United States.    25 
This argument could be supported by the evidence provided in other works. For 
example, Benigno and López-Salido (2002) suggest that there are important differences 
in the degree of price stickiness in the five mayor countries of the euro area, as 
measured by the duration of prices being fixed. In particular, they point out that for 
Germany, the Netherlands and France, the degree of  price stickiness seems to be lower 
to that observed in both Italy and Spain. In the same perspective, Nickell (2003) 
suggests that labour market institutions wildly diverge across the European economies, 
which could produce differentiated patterns in the rigidities of the labour markets. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
The primary objective of the ECB is to achieve and maintain price stability in the medium 
term, where by price stability is meant an inflation rate below but close to 2 per cent. The 
empirical evidence shows that this objective was fulfilled during the first years of EMU, 
but not after 2000, since inflation rate has stayed above that value. However, it could be 
argued that this does not necessarily mean that the ECB has failed to achieve its goal, since 
price stability is assumed to be achieved in the medium term and some authors have quite 
rightly pointed out that the ECB “has not provided any operational definition of what is 
meant by the medium term” (Galí, 2003). 
In a former paper we provided empirical evidence on the convergence in inflation 
rates for the majority of the EU economies for the period 1980-2002, although the 
convergence in inflation rates seemed to stop from late 90’s,  once the inflation rate 
reached a very low level  (Rodriguez-Fuentes and Olivera-Herrera, 2003). New empirical 
evidence presented in this paper reveals the  existence of a high persistence in inflation 
differentials among the current members of the euro zone during the 80’s and 90’s. This 
persistence is much higher than that observed for other long-established currency   26 
unions, such as the existing in between the Spanish regions and the regions of the 
United States. So the main challenge consists on explaining why inflation dispersion is 
similar within the European Monetary Union a nd some regions in the United States, 
while its persistence is higher in the former. As a tentative explanation, we have 
proposed the diverging degrees of nominal rigidities observed across the regions of 
those areas. However, we acknowledge that much further and substantial research on 
this topic is needed.  
Although the causes are still unclear, it is evident that the persistence of inflation 
differentials among euro countries would raise the possibility for the single monetary 
policy not to suit every euro country, particularly because the ECB would not be really 
implementing the “one size interest rate policy” claimed  for the euro area.  
In addition, inflation differentials in Europe could also raise in the near future 
because of the  EU enlargement. A lthough most of the new EU Member States have 
succeeded in reducing inflation rates
20 in the past, they all have much lower income 
levels. It is expected therefore that these new members experience intense growth in the 
near future, so the catching-up process could lead to higher inflation rates, which might 
produce (and perpetuate) “more regional tension” for the single monetary policy. 
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